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Interest Analysis: A Continental Perspective
DIMrrIos EvRIGENIS*
I am much indebted for the invitation to speak at this gathering of distinguished
American conflicts teachers. The only authorization for my doing so might perhaps
be that I belong to those continental lawyers who, since the Sixties, turned their
attention to what afterwards has been termed the American conflicts revolution. After
having taught a generation of European law students the Europe-based traditionalist
school of conflicts thinking, I expressed my reaction towards the most radical of the
new American ideas through violent diatribes.'
Since then, the scenery has undergone important changes. The proposed new
methods of conflicts solutions have found impressive adherence in the American
academic milieu and have broadly penetrated the thinking and language, if not equally
the decision making, of the state and federal judicial machinery. At the same time,
a mounting theoretical criticism is directed at those methods, while their application
both in the courtroom and in the academic laboratory is making more and more
possible a closer definition of their limits.
The time I have at my disposal allows but a few brief comments on a huge,
complex, and highly controversial subject. I will be selective and try to deal with
some aspects of it, hopefully those which a continental lawyer would be expected to
look for in this debate.
I will begin with some assumptions. First, the choice of law method I am
referring to is the interest analysis as proposed by Brainerd Currie and endorsed by
his disciples. I am aware that this statement needs further precision. What I consider
as the defining characteristic of this method is the search for the applicable law
through the identification of legislative interests pointing at the spatial reach of the
substantive rules of the jurisdictions concerned and extracted by construction of those
rules. I will not deal with other contemporary American propositions based on various
choice of law principles or considerations of broad, soft, open-ended conflicts rules.
Second, it is assumed that interest analysis, although initially and perhaps still
proposed as an ecumenical choice of law method, has been in practice confined to
certain areas, particularly torts and related fields.
Third, I will not express views on the rationality, sufficiency, or efficiency of
interest analysis as a choice of law method in interstate conflicts within the American
federation. I feel neither equipped nor willing to take part in this exciting family feud
which has developed into a fierce exchange of argument with the use of a much harder
vocabulary than its continental counterpart.
I think that a non-American lawyer would be entitled to look critically at the
American conflicts propositions, whatever they may be, from at least two points of
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International 471 (1965).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
view: first, interest analysis is advanced not as an American but as a universal method
of choice of law; and, second, interest analysis is used as a choice of law method in
international conflicts. I shall address these two points briefly.
Can interest analysis be the basis of a universal conception of the law of conflict
of laws? My answer is no. This technique is neither practicable nor desirable for
solving international conflicts issues.
It is not practicable because inviting even the most learned judge to identify
spatially operating interests actually or purportedly underlying the substantive rules of
foreign countries connected with the case would not be only inhuman but illusory.
The impracticability of such an exercise would be tremendously enhanced if the
substantive rules-spatial reach test had to be undertaken in a forum that had mandatory
choice of law principles of any kind, judicial notice of foreign law, and granted
remedy for erroneous application or misinterpretation of foreign law.
It is undesirable as an expression of choice of law legislative policy because it
does not leave room for a genuine consideration of foreign interests and leads to an
almost inflexible and inescapable hometrend. Neither judicial experience nor aca-
demic inventiveness offers convincing international conflicts examples of an interest
analysis being something substantially different from a disregard or, in the best case,
a domestic reconstruction of foreign legislative policies. But even on this last
assumption interest analysis does not seem to take account sufficiently of these
domesticated foreign interests for choice of law purposes. If one can expect that a
conflict of interests between the forum and a foreign country will be solved, as a
matter of principle, in favor of the forum law, one would hardly see room for a real
balancing of interests in other terms for a choice of law principled system. The very
concept of true conflict seems to fall logically apart. In its orthodox version, interest
analysis is immune to considerations related to international intercourse and to
domestic interests as they are projected into the international economic and social
environment.
Such a conclusion already contains the answer to the second question I wish to
address. The question is: Can interest analysis serve as the basis for rational and
legitimate American--or any other national-solutions of international conflicts of
law? My answer again would be no. Certainly, every national jurisdiction enjoys,
under international law, a wide freedom in determining the spatial reach of its own
law, either by interest analysis or through traditional conflicts devices. Probably it
enjoys a larger freedom than the permissive definition of constitutional choice of law
limitations, as stated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,2 ascribes to a state within
the American Federation. But the problem, as I see it in the framework of this debate,
is a different one. It is whether a state member of the international community can
rightly respond to the quest of applicable law in international conflicts cases by
adopting a methodology which consists, by definition, of an aggressive unilateralist
approach and can virtually produce solutions that are inherently indifferent to
considerations dictated by an actually growing and politically desirable social,
2. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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economic, and cultural intercourse among the nations. This may be, and probably is,
a choice of law conception that many national legislators would feel free and inclined
to espouse. The question is whether it represents an international conflicts choice of
law philosophy that should be advanced in an academic discussion, as scholarly
advice to the legislator, or as a pattern of behavior in an international legislative
drafting setting such as The Hague Conference on Private International Law. Seen
from this angle, the debate on interest analysis cannot be reduced to an exchange of
argument over methods and techniques. It is a political issue. And I believe this aspect
of the question has been, perhaps surprisingly, neglected in an otherwise thorough and
sometimes prolific discussion.
Consider, for example, the line of thought in the Paris Air Crash3 case. One
cannot criticize the decision for applying the law of the California manufacturer's
residence. But a European lawyer would be skeptical of some of the reasons given
and, in particular, of direct decisional references to cases like Challoner v. Day and
Zimmermann, Inc. 4 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.5 These cases
express an almost inflexible primacy of national governmental interests in interna-
tional cases involving tort liability and victims' or survivors' compensation.
Does interest analysis, as applied in typical conflicts situations, reflect, suggest,
or confirm patterns of legal behavior practiced in other politically sensitive fields such
as the extraterritorial reach of antitrust or export administration legislation? This is a
question that I would like to formulate in this Symposium. The answer to it may cast
an additional light on our subject and perhaps water down, if not invalidate, some
political value judgments which are the secret basis of certain analyst tendencies. This
brings me to my final random comments.
The contemporary European conflicts law is open to new methods as can be seen
from the European Economic Community Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, as well as from some of the recent Hague conventions and
national codifications. One can find in these texts hard and fast, but also broad,
flexible, and open-ended rules. One can also find selective results favoring plaintiffs,
issue by issue analysis, and, of course, a certain presence of policy interest analysis
in its European version expressed through the concept of regles d'application
immediate. The whole system might appear complicated, sometimes sophisticated,
inappropriately eclectic in the eyes of an American conflicts lawyer. It is. Yet the
system is inspired, as a whole, by considerations expressing a real concern for
"multistate policies as such," 6 or for the "maintenance of interstate and international
order,'' 7 or for "accommodations between nations . . . " in "a growing sense of
world Community." 8 Europeans do not pretend to save the world with such a choice
3. Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
4. 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
5. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
6. A. Voi MNE AND D. TtRrutu, CreEs AND MATmts o.; Corucr oF LAws 76 (1965).
7. R. LraMR, AsrastcAN Cocuers LAw 195 (3d ed. 1977); see also RsrATBiFrT (SEcoND) Co.%ulcr OF LAws § 145
(2)(a) (1971).
8. D. CAvERs, T CHOICE OF LAW PRocss 119 n.6 (1965).
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of law system. But we are reasonably satisfied with it and try to improve it constantly
without a spirit of exclusiveness and dogmatism.
I would, nevertheless, like to finish with some words mixing criticism with
praise for interest analysis. This legal theory should be praised not only for having
given back to the law of conflict of laws all its fun as an intellectual game; not only
for having made of it again a field of cruel battle both in semantics and value
judgments on spiritual morality; and not only for having transformed the courts into
adventure playgrounds to the extreme joy of imaginative judges and lawyers. Interest
analysis should also be praised for a very serious reason which is its major, if not its
only substantial, contribution to our subject matter. This reason is that choice of
substantive laws supposes a thorough, profound, and teleological (interest ori-
ented) analysis of the substantive law institutions to be spatially arranged. But there
stop the achievements and perspectives of the method. In the analysts' reasoning,
there is hardly room for a vision of a federation or of an international community, for
with some brilliant exceptions, there is neither historic foundation nor comparative
law background. For the more radical interest analysts, the substantive law analysis
stops halfway, in a state of unfinished maturation and undecided whether or not to
proceed to the search and formulation of choice of law rules or principles. For the
outside observer, interest analysis seems to be working in a rather limited area of law
and social life. It is working with some totemized legislative policy concepts and
cohabitating peacefully and constructively, both in the textbooks and the judicial
decisions, with a lot of traditional, territorial, and blackletter conflicts rules.
To my learned American colleagues, lafleur of the American conflicts thinking,
I say: Less battlecries, less celebration of worn out victories, less exclusiveness in
methods, more pragmatism, more realism regarding the tools proposed, more fed-
eralism and internationalism. Is all that not the very spirit of American law?
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To Brainerd Currie: A Fallen Giant
DONALD H. BERMAN*
Brainerd Currie once remarked that Walter Wheeler Cook "discredited the
vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the
intellectual product of another."' Now Professor Lea Brilmayer has done the same
thing. 2 By lucidly exposing the obfuscations that inhere within interest analysis, she
has performed a consummate act of "trashing" that rivals the finest works of the most
gifted critical legal scholars. 3
However, what has Brilmayer's trashing achieved? To jettison legal rules and
theories merely because they will not withstand critical analysis would leave us in a
state of anarchy. The issue is not whether Currie's view satisfies our sense of logic;
rather, to utilize Professor Robert Sedler's variation of the classic Holmesian cliche,
the issue is whether experience has shown interest analysis to be a workable theory.
4
Professor Brilmayer accurately asserts that interest analysis, both in theory and
in practice, is "pro-resident, pro-forum, and pro-recovery." 5 She and other critics of
interest analysis appear to have four objections to a "pro-resident, pro-forum, and
pro-recovery" jurisprudence.
The first objection is that parochialism violates the Constitution. The parochi-
alism that results from a reductionist extension of Currie's theory might, on occasion,
violate constitutional limitations that inhere in our federal system. However, these
limitations need considerable refinement before they stand as an indictment of interest
analysis. First, the privileges and immunities clause does not protect corporate
defendants from this exercise of parochialism. 6 A "pro-resident, pro-forum, and
pro-recovery ' 7 bias in cases where injured individuals sue corporations that are able
to spread the costs should not run afoul of the fourteenth amendment's minimal
rationality test.8
Most cases involving the apparent disparate treatment of individuals that impli-
cate constitutional norms arise in situations like the unprovided-for case when the
forum refuses to apply its rules against its own domiciliaries unless the domicile of
the nonforum party would do the same. 9 Putting the Constitution aside, one should
ask, as a commonsensical matter, what great injustice has a New York court wrought
* Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
1. B. CURIE, SEIECTED ESSAYS ON -ME CoNaucr OF LAws 6 (1963).
2. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MciH. L. Ra,. 392 (1980); Brilmayer,
Methods and Objective in Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MtERcE L. Ra,. 555 (1984); Brilmayer, Governmental
Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985).
3. See Kelman, Trashing, 36 STA. L. REv. 293 (1984).
4. Sedler, Interest Analysis as the Preferred Approach to Choice of Law: A Response to Professor Brilmayer's
"Foundational Attack," 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 483 (1985).
5. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 398.
6. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
7. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 398.
8. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
9. See Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173, 186-87
(1981).
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when it refuses to permit an individual Ontario plaintiff to recover from a New York
domiciliary when Ontario would not allow recovery?' 0
Professor Brilmayer inappropriately relies on Baldwin v. Seelig" for the exis-
tence of a per se rule preventing states from adopting "pro-resident, pro-forum,
pro-recovery" rules that will line the pockets of their constituents.' 2 Only those
parochial rules that unduly burden interstate commerce run afoul of the commerce
clause.13 If a court or legislature adopts such a burdensome choice of law rule then
it should be struck down in the same manner as any other legislative or judicial act
that threatens federal interests. In actual practice, I have seen very few choice of law
rules where, to borrow from Justice Cardozo's language in Baldwin, "the door has
been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting
commerce between the states to the power of the nation."' 4
The second objection to a "pro-resident, pro-forum, and pro-recovery" juris-
prudence cites the needs of interstate and international systems. The reporters for the
Second Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws concluded that "the smooth
functioning of the interstate and international systems in private law matters should
be the basic consideration in the decision of every choice of law case."' 5 These
multilateral themes formed the basis of Professor Evrigenis' measured critique of
interest analysis. 16
Currie's brand of interest analysis does nothing to further the needs of interstate
and international systems. However, only in rare situations would the application of
Currie's ideas undermine these systemic needs. As a practical matter, choice of law
rules only endanger international and national systems when these rules defeat the
reasonable expectations of parties or invite destructive retaliation. Few tort cases pose
such issues, and most contracts that would rise to this level of importance contain
choice of law provisions that most jurisdictions willingly enforce. Thus, the potential
disruptions of these systems occur only in the rare case where a court, consistent with
Currie's views, disregards such choice of law selection provisions. In these situations,
thoughtful judges who generally sympathize with Currie's approach appropriately
reject it.17
Even when courts employ interest analysis to destroy the legitimate expectations
of parties, such as Oregon's application of its spendthrift law to nullify a loan made
in California by a California domiciliary to an Oregon domiciliary, 18 one still will
find, as the reporters to the Second Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws
candidly admitted, "[I]t is well-nigh impossible to determine whether the needs of the
10. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31
N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
11. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
12. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 416.
13. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
14. Id.
15. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 959, 962 (1952).
16. Evrigenis, Interest Analysis From a Continental Perspective, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 525 (1985).
17. Compare Justice Burger's majority opinion in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) with
his joining of Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 332 (1981).
18. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
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interstate or international system would best be served by the resolution of a given
dispute one way or the other." 19
The third objection to a "pro-resident, pro-forum, and pro-recovery" jurispru-
dence is that it causes a lack of predictability that leads to inefficient conduct. In her
seminal piece, Professor Brilmayer argues that lack of predictability where the statute
regulates conduct is the evil to be remedied. 20 She posits the case of a lawn mower
manufacturer who complies with the forum law requiring a protective shield.
However, since these shields are expensive, the manufacturer, a nonresident of the
forum, only installs them on units sold in the forum state. The plaintiff, a forum
resident, is injured by an unshielded lawn mower which was sold and used in a state
that does not require shields. Brilmayer plausibly argues that Currie's interest analysis
might lead the forum to impose liability.21 She then concludes that " [rlegulations that
are applied on an unpredictable basis impose costs that cannot be justified by social
necessity, since by hypothesis they discourage conduct needlessly. The additional
cost of lawnmower safety shields illustrates this inefficiency." 22
This argument misstates the common understanding of efficiency. Let us not
forget that failure to engage in this needless conduct resulted in an injury for which
someone must bear the cost. No manufacturer will install extra shields on the mere
possibility of such a rare occurrence; rather they will insure against such eventualities.
In fact, the only issue is whether the defendant's casualty insurer pays, the plaintiff
and his insurers pay, or the state of the plaintiff's domicile pays for the injury. This
choice does not implicate efficiency concerns unless Professor Brilmayer believes that
the victim should have altered his conduct to have minimized the risk of injury. 23
The fourth objection to a "pro-resident, pro-forum, and pro-recovery" juris-
prudence is that it leads to forum shopping. 24 Yet except for helping injured plaintiffs
recover, she does not articulate an objection to forum shopping other than that it
diminishes predictability which is a problem a simple insurance policy can readily
solve.
Professor David Cavers, in a mythical judicial opinion reflecting the thinking of
Erwin Griswold, predicted many of the problems resulting from expansive jurisdic-
tional rules accompanied by unfettered choice of law theory:
Even after an injury of some sort has occurred, there is, under such a [non-lex loci] rule,
no basis for advising a client as to his rights, or for settling or adjusting the dispute without
litigation. All that the lawyer can say is, 'Well, it depends upon the state in which the suit
is brought. We will have to see where we can serve the defendant, and then try to find the
state where the prospects are best. Perhaps we should sue in three or four states, and then
nurse the several cases along until we see how the precedents develop.'
19. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 15, at 963.
20. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 406.
21. Id. at 404-05.
22. Id. at 407.
23. See R. Pos.%m, THE Eco.osuc ANAMysis oF LAw 72 (1973).
24. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 399.
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All this is fun for lawyers, and provides much for the law professors to write about.
But it is not law.2-
This multiplicity of lawsuits creates inefficiency by increasing the transaction
costs involved in resolving these disputes. However, note that interest analysis,
standing alone, did not produce this inefficiency. Rather, amorphous jurisdictional
rules,26 procedural rules which do not require plaintiffs to state carefully their causes
of action, 27 and a mercurial body of substantive tort law have potentiated with the
kinetics of choice of law theory.
This attack on "pro-resident, pro-forum, and pro-recovery" policies has the
practical effect of sacrificing individualized justice for the sake of predictability,
efficiency, and multilateralism. To understand this contemporary ideological ritual
that would leave many personal injury plaintiffs uncompensated, I suggest placing
choice of law methodology within the broader context of other jurisprudential and
intellectual movements.
The demise of the strict territorial theory and the rise of interest analysis occurred
during a period when the Supreme Court, in bringing the Lochner28 era to a close, 29
removed the fourteenth amendment proscriptions that had impeded the states' efforts
to solve many of their social problems. The New Deal Court in Alaska Packers
Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,30 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission,3' and Carroll v. Lanza3 2 accompanied its eviscer-
ation of Lochner with a clear rejection of prior dicta suggesting that the fourteenth
amendment and the full faith and credit clause incorporated the vested rights theory
as a limitation on the solutions that states could employ in cases that arose in a
multistate context. 33
Consistent with this spirit of anti-Lochnerian federalism, the Supreme Court
decided Erie Railroad v. Tompkins34 in 1938 and required federal district courts in
diversity cases to use the substantive law of the state in which they sat. Three years
later in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. ,35 the Court made clear that
the rule in Erie applied equally to choice of law rules.
These two doctrinal shifts amounted to the prenatal constitutionalizing of the
teachings of Currie. By 1941 a state could, with few exceptions, choose a rule to solve
a social problem and apply its rule to a multistate transaction in which it had an interest
irrespective of the strong interests of other jurisdictions. Yet this was a rather benign
25. D. CAvERS, THE CHOICE-or-LAw PRocEss 23 (1965).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 37-44.
27. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permit pleading of bare bone facts, were adopted in 1938. 308
U.S. 645-766. Today, most states have adopted, with modifications, these rules.
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that New York could not impose a maximum number of
hours that bakers could work).
29. See G. GuNrHRe, CONSTrTWIONAL LAw, 533-44 (10th ed. 1980).
30. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
31. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
32. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
33. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Bradford Elec. Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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doctrinal mutation because most states still adhered to the territorial view and the
Court had not yet sanctioned jurisdictional promiscuity.
By 1945, when the Supreme Court decided International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington,36 jurisdictional rules which ostensibly required a state to base jurisdiction on
actual power over the defendant or his property had spawned a number of Ptolemaic
epicycles such as quasi in rem jurisdiction,3 7 corporate "presence, ' 38 and "implied
consent.' 39 Thus, International Shoe, which articulated a jurisdictional theory based
on "reasonableness," "fair play," and "justice,' ' 4° rounded out the Court's post-
Lochnerian jurisprudence. By 1957 the Supreme Court had, for all practical purposes,
permitted states to exercise jurisdiction over, and to apply their law to, out-of-state
defendants whose contacts with the forum were most attenuated. 4'
Many state courts responded to this new federalism by stretching jurisdictional
principles to their limits and totally discarding any traditional notions of territoriality
in choice of law theory. For example, New York, in Seider v. Roth,42 permitted a
plaintiff to base jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant by garnishing his insurer's
obligation to defend. Since many insurers do business nationwide, this permitted New
York to bring before its courts many individual defendants who had never had any
dealings with New York.
New York abandoned the vested rights-territorial theory of choice of law, freeing
itself to apply its own law to any transaction involving a New York domiciliary
irrespective of the legitimate interests of other jurisdictions. 43 And, of course, Klaxon
required that federal courts follow suit. Rosenthal v. Warren,44 a case in which a
federal district court in New York would not permit a Massachusetts physician to raise
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute to limit damages in a medical malpractice
case involving an operation that took place in Boston, has become a watershed from
which to view a new jurisdictional and choice of law jurisprudence. Judge Lumbard's
dissent, in apparent disregard of the Court's sweeping dictum in Carroll v. Lanza45
and presaging themes that have appeared in recent scholarship, suggested that the
application of New York law to an operation performed in Massachusetts would
violate the full faith and credit clause. 46
Not surprisingly, our jurisprudence has retreated from the license of Rosenthal.
Most legal movements, like other human endeavors, develop pendularly. It should
come as no surprise that the vested rights-territorial theory of choice of law which was
in vogue during the first half of the twentieth century differed substantially from
36. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
37. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
38. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (1930).
39. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
40. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322 (Black, J., dissenting).
41. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
42. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
43. See Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 73, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
44. 342 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
46. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1973) (Lombard, J., dissenting).
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choice of law theories propounded by Joseph Story during the first part of the
nineteenth century. 47
Nor should one have ever expected the territorial view to last. It defied common
sense to believe that judges would ignore the policies behind the laws they apply.
However, legal theories rarely die with a bang; they expire with a whimper. The
ability of the territorialists to recharacterize cases48 or create exceptions 49 to their
general rules in order to effectuate policies led to a system that surpassed the
Ptolemaists for complexity and irrelevancy of prediction.
Brainerd Currie, a gifted doctrinal muckraker, did nothing more than carry the
reasoning of Professor Cavers and other critics of the vested rights theory50 to its logical
extreme. 5' Ifjudges must examine policies behind rules before choosing to apply them,
then why not limit such explorations solely to policies which would inevitably lead
the forum to apply its law in furtherance of its domestic policies?52
The legal establishment, believing that the society is crumbling under the
pressure of incessant, protracted litigation which lines the pockets of lawyers, 53 has
energized another oscillation. The Supreme Court has recently curtailed the power of
states to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 54 In 1981 three dissenting
Justices urged modification of the rules that granted a state's broad license to apply
its own law to any transaction with which it has contact. 55 And during this past term,
the Court, with but one dissent, ended a five decade refusal to declare unconstitutional
a forum state's application of forum law to a transaction over which the forum had
jurisdiction.56 The Court has modified doctrine to preclude relitigation of claims. 57
Also, the Supreme Court has approved modifications of our federal procedural rules
to reduce the costs of dispute resolution. 58 Reformers incessantly propose substantive
law reforms hoping that they will efficiently solve problems without resorting to
costly litigation. 59
47. Compare J. SToRiY, CoETARIES oN TE CoNucr OF LAws §§ 33-35 (2d ed. 1841), basing a forum's obligation
to use foreign law on notions of comity, with REsTATaETr OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 1934, which totally rejects any notion
of comity.
48. See, e.g., Grant v. MeAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (classifying survival of causes of action
as procedural).
49. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y. S.2d 133 (1961) (held that
New York's public policy against wrongful death statutes sanctioned the application of New York law to an accident that
occurred in Massachusetts).
50. See W. COOK, THE LOGICAL ND LEGAL BASTS OF THE CONFLicr OF LAws (1942); E. LoRszEN, SnrcnED ARsmcLEs oN
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947).
51. See B. CuRI, supra note 1, at 79-80.
52. B. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 169.
53. For a fine review of the literature setting forth the theme that "we suffer from an excessive amount of disputing
and of litgation ... " see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4, 6 (1983).
54. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
55. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. Phillips Pet. Co. v. Shutts, 53 U.S.L.W. 4879 (1985).
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TO BRAINERD CURRIE: A FALLEN GIANT
A new generation of reformers "have discovered" that "Currie was as meta-
physical as Beale."6 No doubt the highly malleable contours of Currie's metaphysics
reflect the fact that most "[i]nterest analysts inject their own normative preferences
into choice of law discussions." 61 I suspect that Professor Sedler and other nonre-
visionist defenders of interest analysis believe that the doctrine has worked because
they share my political view that it is all right for judges to help out accident victims
by shifting costs on to those who can easily insure. Also they would probably agree
that rejecting interest analysis will not contribute much to a harmonious multilater-
alism or to a capping of the litigation gusher.
A change in the political climate, not flawed logic or awkward evolutionary
deformities, have lessened the attraction of interest analyses. Unlike Beale, who wrote
during the early decades of the twentieth century when judges generally "denied any
lawmaking function .... "62 Currie wrote in the era of the late 1950's and early
1960's when judges and legal scholars legitimated a judicial activism that blurred the
institutional differences between courts and legislatures. 63 Now, Professor Brilmayer
and her contemporary critics of Currie's theories write from a perspective of failed
judicial initiatives. 64
Until our nation adopts a comprehensive national social insurance system our
choice of law theories will remain self-contradictory. The architects of the Second
Restatement listed ten factors, in their order of importance, that should influence
choice of law thinking. The greatest concern was furtherance of interstate and
international interests, while attempts to achieve "justice in the individual case" 65
was of the least concern.
However, many judges just will not sacrifice "individual justice" for the party
who appears before their courts to some greater abstraction, particularly since few
cases raise systemic concerns because the parties have adequately protected them-
selves either by choice of law clauses or insurance. Unfortunately, this search for
individualized justice invites the manipulation of rules that make it difficult to predict
results on the basis of doctrine. The resulting doctrinal mosaic does rival Beale's
territorialism for its Ptolemaic complexity. This "chaos," as Professor Cavers so
artfully suggested, 66 engenders wasteful expenditures.
While engaging in their intellectual dissection, I urge Currie's detractors to
remember that his theories often permitted courts to use rather humane and com-
monsensical approaches to the solutions of multistate problems. I pray that their
intellectual coffins will be marked by similar epitaphs.
60. Brilmayer, Methods and Objective in Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, supra note 2, at 563.
61. Id. at 562.
62. G. Wnrm, TnE Aitmc.A JuDicict TRADrON 149 (1976).
63. See id. at 295.
64. See Galanter, supra note 53, at 6 n.4.
65. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 15, at 981.
66. D. CAvERs, upra note 25.
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